Space & Astronomy/Space and Astronomy (October 1993).iso/pc/text/spacedig/v11_2/v11_258.txt

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Subject: SPACE Digest V11 #258

SPACE Digest                                     Volume 11 : Issue 258

Today's Topics:
          Space Shuttle Development (6 of 7)
        Re: releasing data / digitized images
          Space Shuttle Development (2 of 7)
          Space Shuttle Development (4 of 7)
           Re: Pegsat Update (Forwarded) - 04/09/90
----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: 12 Apr 90 03:02:13 GMT
From: usc!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!sdd.hp.com!elroy.jpl.nasa.gov!zardoz.cpd.com!dhw68k!ofa123![e-mail]  (Wales Larrison)
Subject: Space Shuttle Development (6 of 7)


  NASA's cost data base was extensive, based upon up to 6 independent
cost analyses designs for similar systems, and very specifically
showed the differences in vehicle configuration and recurring cost
from limiting development costs.
     (Example data shown from summary contractor data...)
   [Summary Data from 3 August 1971 JSC internal report]
Grumman Concepts - all 1 1/2 stage, thrust augmented systems.

                  Expendable   Expendable     Expendable     Reuse
                  Liq Booster  Liq Booster    Solid Bstr     Orb &
                  (Reuse Cryo  Reuse Orb      Reuse Orb      Booster
                   Tanks)
                  Reuse Orb
DDT&E ($M)
  Orbiter           2,600       2,615           2,615         2,586
  Booster/SRM         153         537             338         2,724
  Reuse Cryo Tanks    301
  Main Engine         657         769             657           655
  Flt test            651         693             664           936
    Total           4,362       4,614           4,274         7,079


Production ($M)
  Orbiter             482         544             544           491
  Booster/SRM       1,369       2,612           5,644         1,121
  Tanks             2,259
     Total          4,110       3,156           6,188         1,612

Operations            998       2,131           1,105         1,475

Total Program       9,470       9,901          11,567         9,988

Peak Annual         1,100       ?????           1,100         1,640
 Funding

Direct Cost          9.82       10.26           14.66          3.23
 per Flight

Note:(translating from 1971 dollars to 1990 dollars, yields a cost per
flight of           35.84       37.45           53.51         11.79
these were for a 40,000 pound payload system, and yielded a cost per
pound (1990$) of    $896        $936            $1338         $295  ).

  NASA still had not been given the official go-ahead for shuttle
development, although the primary decision had apparently already been
made in the White House.  In a calculated measure, NASA was forced by
OMB to go through repeated attempts to reduce the Shuttle development
costs.  (Ref: Pace, Logsdon)  Casper Weinberger, Deputy Director of
the OMB, told his staff that they had a free hand to work on NASA to
reduce program costs.  Through November and December of 1971 OMB and
NASA fought over the shuttle design and configuration (despite all of
the previous contracted studies and study results).  To force NASA to
consider smaller, lower-cost shuttles, OMB kept specifying specific
designs to be evaluated by NASA, and NASA kept arguing against the
technical ability of OMB to cost-design a shuttle system.
                                                (cont)


--- Opus-CBCS 1.10
 * Origin: Universal Electronics, Inc. (1:103/302.0)
--
Wales Larrison
...!{dhw68k,zardoz,lawnet,conexch}!ofa123!Wales.Larrison                             [e-mail]
714 544-0934 2400/1200/300

------------------------------

Date: 12 Apr 90 16:31:56 GMT
From: hplabsb![e-mail]  (David Smith)
Subject: Re: releasing data / digitized images

In article <[e-mail]> [e-mail] (Ted Fabian) writes:
>meanwhile, a bigger question is whether the capability to provide the data
>in the format that you all desire even exists...
> ...
>      again, given the density of the data, and the
>      state of the art available today, putting something in one format
>      will please some of the people, but not all.. so who picks the format??
>      or are multiple copies stored in different formats??  etc. etc...

So let the originators make it available in whatever format they use,
and make a description of the format available with the data.  Let those
who want the pix make the format translation.
--
    David R. Smith, HP Labs    | "It is said that St. Patrick drove the
    [e-mail]    | snakes out of Ireland.  They were last seen
    [phone]        | selling junk bonds."  -- Johnny Carson

------------------------------

Date: 12 Apr 90 01:47:35 GMT
From: usc!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!sdd.hp.com!elroy.jpl.nasa.gov!zardoz.cpd.com!dhw68k!ofa123![e-mail]  (Wales Larrison)
Subject: Space Shuttle Development (2 of 7)


  To scope this effort, there are about 100 Phase A studies awarded
forevery Phase C/D, since not every conceptual idea is ever pursued.
Typical Phase A studies range from $100K to $5M or so, and take up to
a couple of years to complete.  Phase B studies have at least 2
competitors, usually take 1-2 years to complete, and range in the $5-
$50 million range.  There is usually only 1 winner of Phase C/D
contracts, but the loser may be brought in later, as a "second source"
or as a contractor for some parts of the overall system, if their
design is superior in those areas (as was done with the F-16 and F-18)

  From the documentation I have, Space Shuttle design studies began in
about 1968, with studies by MDAC of a Gemini-derived 9-12 man
spacecraft ("Big-G") for resupplying a space Station.  In the heady
days after the first moon landing, NASA and the administration had
mapped out an overall plan for future space activities which included
Space Station, a Lunar Base, Manned Mission to Mars, continued use of
the Saturn-series of Rockets, and a Space Shuttle.
  Ref: "America's Next Decade in Space: A Report for the Space Task
       Group", NASA, Sep. 1969

  To gather more insight into what it would take to accomplish this
ambitious plan for space activities, NASA began a series of Phase A
and technology studies.  (It should be noted this included Phase A
studies of Lunar Bases, Saturn-derived launch vehicles, Manned Mars
Missions, and Space Stations, among others).  They let four Phase A
contracts for "Integrated Launch and Reentry Vehicle" studies,
totaling $1.8 M, in 1969.  These included:
   o McDonnell-Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC), contract NAS 9-
9204 (with LaRC) of a HL-10 body shape with a straight wing and
25,000 lb payload.
   o North American Rockwell (NAR), contract NAS 9-9205, (with JSC)
of a straight wing vehicle with a 50,000 lb payload.
   o Lockheed Missile and Space Corporation (LMSC), contract NAS 9-
9206, (with MSFC) for a 1 1/2 stage vehicle with a double delta wing,
launched in a triamese configuration.  (This is later redirected to 2
stage fully reusable configuration, as the triamese proved unstable.)
  o General Dynamics (GD), contract NAS 9-9207, (with MSFC), of a
triamese vehicle configuration with a two-element swing wing and
50,000 pound payload.
  Martin Marrieta performed a parallel study effort under company
money (they had lost the Phase A competition), which followed the same
schedule, of a launcher with a 36,500 pound payload called the
"Spacemaster".

  In parallel, and based upon the results of these Phase A study
contracts, NASA (At JSC, MSFC, and LaRC) studied a series of
alternative conceptual designs and performed system sizing studies
(contractually supported by MDAC), including a "DC-3 Shuttle"
design supported by Vought aviation.
                                        (Cont)


--- Opus-CBCS 1.10
 * Origin: Universal Electronics, Inc. (1:103/302.0)
--
Wales Larrison
...!{dhw68k,zardoz,lawnet,conexch}!ofa123!Wales.Larrison                             [e-mail]
714 544-0934 2400/1200/300

------------------------------

Date: 12 Apr 90 01:52:35 GMT
From: zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!sdd.hp.com!elroy.jpl.nasa.gov!zardoz.cpd.com!dhw68k!ofa123![e-mail]  (Wales Larrison)
Subject: Space Shuttle Development (4 of 7)


   A detailed independent economic analysis of the Shuttle program was
prepared, at the request of Congress. This was made by an outside,
non-aerospace consulting firm.  This was a pivotal step, in that it
forced NASA to identify the Shuttle as the primary means of performing
a variety of roles for NASA, DoD, and other users; and forced NASA
into a public justification of the Shuttle on near-term financial
grounds, when other reasons for such a system were more fundamental
(as part of a long term American space strategy).  NASA now had to get
DoD assurances it would use the shuttle for all its launches and began
designing to meet all DoD launch requirements.  NASA was forced to
show Congress and the Administration how any system selected would be
cheaper than any alternative launch system.  Results from this
economic analysis would be used as the rationale to "phase out" other
launch systems.
    "Economic Analyses of New Space Transportation Systems",
     Mathematica, Inc., 2 volumes, May 1971
  At this point, NASA stopped providing strategy for future space
programs, and began a long series of tactical battles focusing on
narrower and narrower budgetary battles. It had to meet strict
economic criteria imposed by OMB (who maintained an independent
shuttle system design group), and was encouraged to design a shuttle
that could "do all things and be all things" to all users to get the
maximum cost effectiveness.  This made it very difficult to accept
suggestions for smaller, less capable, and less risky shuttle systems,
or to accept the added costs of parallel development programs which
could reduce technical risks.
  While the two stage fully reusable configuration was the option
offered the lowest potential cost per flight (as shown by all of the
Phase A studies), the overall cost to develop the system was attacked
by Congress and OMB.  Other options for the Space Shuttle
configuration had to be examined.
  In parallel to the Phase B contracts, Grumman and Lockheed were
given supporting contracts to study "Alternative Space Shuttle
Concepts" which included a 1 1/2 stage thrust-augmented system, a
solid booster/reusable orbiter system, reusable booster and orbiter
system, and a minimum risk fully reusable system.  This was done as
extensions to their Phase A studies, and essentially were parallel
Phase B studies to the fully reusable system selected.  Each was
funded at $14 M.
    Lockheed, contract NAS 8-26362 (with MSFC), 1970
    Grumman, contract NAS 9-11160 (with MSFC), 1970

  It should be noted that numerous parallel technology studies were
being performed.  These included a foamed silica coated borosilicate
glass studied for a reusable heat shield (which offered a 10:1 weight
reduction and greatly decreased costs over metallic thermal protection
systems), reusable cryo tankage, advanced materials, and cryo engines.
                                        (Cont)


--- Opus-CBCS 1.10
 * Origin: Universal Electronics, Inc. (1:103/302.0)
--
Wales Larrison
...!{dhw68k,zardoz,lawnet,conexch}!ofa123!Wales.Larrison                             [e-mail]
714 544-0934 2400/1200/300

------------------------------

Date: 12 Apr 90 20:44:17 GMT
From: ux1.cso.uiuc.edu!aries![e-mail]  (Doug McDonald)
Subject: Re: Pegsat Update (Forwarded) - 04/09/90

In article <[e-mail]> [e-mail] (Mike McManus) writes:
>In article <[e-mail]> [e-mail] (Ron Baalke) writes:
>>   being analyzed.  The two chemical release events will occur over
>>   Northern Canada between April 14-28, local weather permitting.
>
>I've heard a lot about the planned barium (right?) release, but nothing about
>why it's being done.  What is this experiment for?  Thanks!
>

It is going to fog the mirror of the Hubble Space Telescope with barium
so it won't work any more. Maybe the HST will be late enough to escape!

Doug McDonald>

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End of SPACE Digest V11 #258
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